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ABSTRACT 
Counterdrug operations are of national interest to the U.S. and our allies because the 
illegal production and trafficking of drugs threatens U.S. national security and 
undermines security and stability in Latin America.  Since law enforcement tasked with 
counterdrug operations is not given enough platforms to search every location at all 
times, they must decide how to employ their scarce platforms.  To assist law 
enforcement, we develop a defender-attacker optimization model that utilizes actionable 
intelligence to coordinate the simultaneous, cooperative disposition of law enforcement 
platforms in an optimal manner against a smuggler.  The model utilizes stochastic 
dynamic programming to represent an intelligent smuggler, who has the ability to 
reevaluate his remaining path at decision points along his journey, based on knowledge 
obtained en route and expectations previously derived.  The model employs Global 
Benders’ Decomposition to determine the optimal placement of three different types of 
law enforcement platforms simultaneously prosecuting one of three possible types of 
smuggler.  We show that such computations cannot be performed fast enough to be used 
in a tactical decision aid, since they typically require in excess of two hours.  Upon 
further analysis using our model, we determine a large number of defender missions do 
not have a substantial impact on the attacker’s risk.  Based on the results of our model, 
we believe further algorithmic development is needed for implementation into a tactical 
decision aid to assist in counter drug operations. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Maritime drug smugglers in the Eastern Pacific Ocean have historically used a 
combination of seacraft to smuggle contraband.  These seacraft include Go-Fast power 
boats, Panga commercial fishing vessels, and Self Propelled Semi-Submersibles.  To 
defend against smuggling, law enforcement participating in counterdrug operations 
employ platforms such as Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and the maritime patrol 
aircraft Orion and Hercules.  But law enforcement faces the predicament of having only a 
few available platforms at any given time, and searching for a single smuggler can tie up 
many law enforcement platforms.  Current law enforcement strategy relies heavily on 
actionable intelligence, with consideration of geography and weather to help determine 
the most advantageous positioning of their platforms.  There is no computer-based 
tactical tool to aid these platform employment decisions. 
We introduce a tactical decision aid to recommend placement of the limited law 
enforcement platforms.  This planning aid will provide optimal placement through 
mission assignment while considering the intelligent response of the smugglers.  A 
successful operation against a smuggler requires detection, monitoring, tracking, and 
interdiction.  This thesis addresses detection only. 
We develop a defender-attacker optimization model to optimally place law 
enforcement platforms in order to maximize the smuggler’s minimum expected risk, from 
the time and location the smuggler is spotted.  We assume the smuggler to be intelligent 
and have imperfect knowledge of law enforcement platform placement, but that he is 
aware that there is law enforcement that must be avoided.  Additionally, the smuggler 
only gains perfect knowledge of scenarios and defender placement on immediate path 
segments, just before he decides to take that path.  We demonstrate our defender-attacker 
model prescribes the optimal law enforcement missions to maximize the smuggler’s risk, 
but is not fast enough to be used in a tactical decision aid. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
Counterdrug operations (CD) are of great interest and high operational importance 
to the United States.  Successful CD involve four phases: detection, monitoring, tracking, 
and interdiction, and are the operational background to this thesis, which addresses 
detection only.  We develop a defender-attacker optimization model utilizing actionable 
intelligence to coordinate the simultaneous, cooperative disposition of limited law 
enforcement platforms in against an intelligent smuggler.  We define an intelligent 
smuggler as someone who has the ability to reevaluate his remaining path at decision 
points along his journey, based on knowledge obtained en route and expectations 
previously derived.  The model developed in this thesis encompasses three different types 
of law enforcement platforms and three different types of smuggler seacraft.  We 
implement the model for several cases that take place in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.  With 
further algorithmic development, the model could be implemented in a tactical decision 
aid and produce real-time recommendations for courses of actions to law enforcement.  
B. THE DRUG SMUGGLING THREAT 
Ninety percent of the cocaine and forty-seven percent of the heroin that reaches 
the United States originates in or passes through Colombia.  Illegal drugs kill more than 
21,000 Americans every year and result in the loss of “more than $160 billion in 
revenue” (United States Southern Command, 2010).  U.S. Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM) has been designated as the lead U.S. government agency to counter drug 
smuggling.  The principal interdiction arm of SOUTHCOM is Joint Interagency Task 
Force South (JIATF-S), which is composed of representatives from several U.S., 
European, and Latin American law enforcement agencies.  By collaborating with other 
agencies and nations to detect, monitor, track, and interdict drug runners, coordinated 
efforts have disrupted the flow of more than 215 metric tons of cocaine in 2009, with 
similar numbers recorded in 2007 and 2008 (SOUTHCOM, 2010). 
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Drug smugglers continue to adapt to law enforcement successes.  Not only have 
their strategies and tactics changed, but so have their seacraft.  These include the Self-
Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS) (Figure 1), the Panga fishing boat (Figure 2), and the 
Go-Fast powerboat (Figure 3).  
  
Figure 1.   Self Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS) (From Wikipedia.org 2010). 
  
Figure 2.   Panga Fishing Boat (From Travelismo.com 2010). 
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Figure 3.   Go-Fast Powerboat (From Wikipedia.org 2010). 
The SPSS represents the emerging sophistication and innovation of drug 
traffickers to adapt to U.S. and regional counter-drug capabilities.  The hull of an SPSS 
rises only about a foot above the waterline, so the craft is hard to see from a distance, 
leaves little wake, and produces only a small radar signature.  SOUTHCOM, the U.S. 
Coast Guard, and regional officials consider the SPSS a serious threat to U.S. and 
regional security.  Navy Admiral Jim Stavridis, former Commander, SOUTHCOM, 
stated, “What worries me [about the SPSS] is if you move that much cocaine, what else 
can you put in that semi-submersible.  Can you put a weapon of mass destruction in it?” 
(SOUTHCOM, 2010).  With limited number of law enforcement platforms, and a large 
area of water to defend, one way to help find drug smuggling seacraft is with smarter 
methods of employing the enforcement platforms. 
Currently, there is no tactical computer-based tool to aid mission planners 
performing counterdrug operations (private communication with Sellers, 2010).  This 
thesis develops and implements an attacker-defender model for optimally employing 
search platforms such as Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates (FFGs) (Figure 4) and the 
maritime patrol aircraft Orion (P-3s) (Figure 5) and Hercules (C-130s) (Figure 6) in 
maritime counterdrug operations.  
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Figure 4.   U.S. Navy Oliver Hazard Perry-class Frigate (From  
defenseindustrydaily.com 2010). 
 
Figure 5.   U.S. Department of Homeland Security P-3 Orion Airborne Early Warning 




Figure 6.   U.S. Coast Guard C-130 Hercules Maritime Patrol Aircraft (From 
Wikimedia.org 2010).  
C. RELATED WORK 
Defender-attacker models have been used to model counter-smuggling efforts.  
Wood (1993) constructs a defender-attacker model to best apportion a limited number of 
SOUTHCOM resources to reduce the flow of drugs through South America.  Dimitrov et 
al. (2008) implement a stochastic defender-attacker model to provide optimal radiation 
detector locations to counter nuclear smuggling.  Pfeiff (2009) uses a defender-attacker 
model to recommend the optimal placement and disposition of JIATF-S platforms. 
Washburn and Wood (1995) view the problem of placing defender(s) as a simultaneous 
play, two-person zero-sum game and develop corresponding algorithms based on 
network models.  In the above papers, the attacker (the smuggler) is trying to minimize 
his risk while the defender (law enforcement) is trying to maximize that same risk (i.e., a 
max-min problem).  However, none of these papers model the attacker as intelligent in 
the sense defined above, yet it may be more realistic to view him as such. 
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In this thesis, we develop models that deal with an intelligent attacker. To the 
author’s knowledge, there is only one attempt along this line in the literature.  Dimitrov 
and Morton (2008) formulate a stochastic defender-attacker model using dynamic 
programming where law enforcement’s goal is to deploy stationary detectors to minimize 
the probability that a smuggler avoids detection.  The smuggler is not fully in control of 
his movement and obeys a Markov decision process.  Specifically, the smuggler solves a 
stochastic shortest-path problem where at each node in a network, the smuggler selects a 
probability distribution that determines the smuggler’s next node.  In this thesis, we adopt 
a similar model but consider movable sensors and a different stochastic shortest-path 
problem where the smuggler is in full control of his movement, but has incomplete 
information about the risks along various routes as described in detail below.    
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter II 
presents the formulation of a defender-attacker model, and the algorithms we use to solve 
it.  Chapter III discusses numerical results.  Chapter IV summarizes this research and 
presents the conclusions.  The appendices provide assumptions and rationale we use to 
determine the attacker’s risk.  Specifically, Appendix A provides details of the derivation 
of the probabilities of detection for each of law enforcement’s platforms against each of 
the smuggler’s seacraft.  Appendix B provides details of the atmospheric conditions and 
their affect on the probabilities of detection mentioned above. 
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II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, we present a defender-attacker optimization model which 
coordinates the simultaneous, cooperative disposition of law enforcement platforms in an 
optimal manner against an intelligent smuggler.  We begin by discussing a network 
describing the movement possibilities of the smuggler.  Then we formulate the 
smuggler’s problem as a stochastic shortest-path problem and formulate a problem that 
optimally allocates law enforcement platforms.  We conclude this chapter with a brief 
discussion of our employment of Global Benders’ Decomposition Algorithm for solving 
the resulting model. 
B. SETTING AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
We consider a situation in which a smuggler seeks to move from a node s to a 
node d in a directed graph in such a way that his expected risk, as defined precisely 
below, is minimized and his travel time does not exceed a given threshold.  Each node in 
the graph represents a physical location and each arc represents the possibility of 
movement between two nodes for the smuggler; see Figure 7, which depicts a simple 
network in the eastern Pacific Ocean.  We refer to the smuggler as the attacker. 
Each arc is associated with a set of scenarios, each of which occurs with a known 
probability.  The scenario represents a set of conditions that the attacker may face.  Each 
scenario is associated with a probability of detection, which as explained below, is 
referred to as “risk” after a logarithmic transformation.  The set of scenarios on an arc 
defines all possible conditions the attacker may face on the arc.  We assume that the 
occurrence of scenarios on any two arcs is independent, i.e., the knowledge about the 
occurrence of a scenario on one arc does not provide any information about the 
probability of a specific scenario occurring on another arc.  
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The attacker does not know which scenario is taking place on an arc until he 
arrives at the tail node of the arc.  At that point, he learns the scenario on the arc and 
therefore his probability of avoiding detection if he traverses that arc.  An arc is also 
associated with a travel time that may depend on the scenario.  These scenarios occur 
according to a probability distribution.  The attacker would like to travel from s to d with 
minimum expected risk, subject to a total time constraint.  He does not need to commit to 
a path a priori.  Rather, he adapts a policy where at each node he only selects the next arc 
to traverse.  The attacker would like to determine a policy for this arc selection that 
minimizes his expected risk, while satisfying the time constraint.  We call this the 
Attacker’s Problem (AP). 
 
Figure 7.   Eastern Pacific Ocean with a graph defining possible paths for a smuggler, 
(From Google Maps, 2010). 
The defender has a number of search platforms, each of which he assigns to a 
mission.  A mission is a set of arcs that a search platform may search in an attempt to 
detect the attacker.  Due to operational constraints, the defender must assign all search 
platforms to missions prior to the departure of the smuggler from node s.  Hence, the 
defender is unable to capitalize on information acquired during the search operation.  The 
presence or absence of a search platform on an arc may influence both the risk in the 
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scenarios and the probability of the scenarios for the attacker on that arc.  The defender’s 
goal is to maximize the attacker’s minimum expected risk.  We call this problem the 
Optimal Detection Problem (ODP).  We formulate the ODP as a defender-attacker model, 
develop an algorithm for its solution, and incorporate the algorithm in a prototype of a 
decision aid. 
C. MODEL FORMULATION 
1. The Attacker 
We formulate ODP by first considering AP for a given set of missions for the 
defender.  The next section gives the full model.  
The attacker would like to travel from s to d within a certain time window and 
without being detected by the defender.  However, both travel times and detection 
probabilities are uncertain, and represented by “scenarios.”  Since the attacker plans to 
repeat similar travel many times, for planning purposes, he aims to minimize the expected 
probability of detection.  The attacker’s movements are modeled using a physical graph 
( ),G N A= , with an explicit representation of time added.  The physical graph comprises 
physical locations, represented by nodes, ,i j N∈ , which are connected by arcs, 
( ),i j A∈ , defining potential movements between nodes.  The set A may include self-
loops of the form ( ),i i A∈ .  Time is discretized into time periods t = 0, 1, 2, ….  The 
attacker must depart node s during time periods t = 0, 1, …., t0,max and must arrive at node 
d no later than tmax time periods after he departs node s.   
Each arc  (i, j) ∈A and time period t is associated with a set of scenarios ijtΩ .  A 
scenario is a possible condition the attacker may experience while transiting an arc at a 
particular time period.  As we see below, the attacker’s travel time and his probability of 
avoiding detection on the arc may depend on the scenario he realizes.  The scenario 
ijt ijtω ∈Ω  occurs with probability ijtijtq ω , hence 1ijtijt ijt ijtq ωω ∈Ω =∑ .  The attacker has a 
probability 
ijtijt
p ω  of surviving (i.e., avoiding detection) while traveling along arc 
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 (i, j) ∈A  if he departs node i at time t  and scenario ijt ijtω ∈Ω  is realized.  That travel 
takes 
ijtijtωτ  time periods, with τ ijtω ijt  being a positive integer.  We assume that the 
detection events are independent.  Let log
ijt ijtijt ijt
r pω ω≡ −  denote the corresponding risk.   
The goal of the attacker is to minimize the expected risk associated with traveling 
from node s to node d given the following ability to observe scenarios.  In general, the 
attacker is unaware of the scenario he will face at a particular arc and time.  However, if 
the attacker is located at node i in time period t, then he will observe a specific scenario 
ijt ijtω ∈Ω for all ij F∈ , where { | ( , ) }iF j N i j A= ∈ ∈  is the forward star of node i.  This 
observation is made prior to making a decision about which node to proceed to from i.    
 
The Attacker Model (AM) takes the following form: 
 
Indices and Index Sets 
,i j N∈  nodes in physical graph 
( ),i j A∈   arcs in physical graph   
iF    arcs in the forward star of node i ∈N in the physical graph 
 t   time period ,   0,  1,  .,  t = …  
ijt ijtω ∈Ω   scenario on arc  (i, j) ∈A  in time period t , ijt ijtω ∈Ω  
it itω ∈Ω   scenario vector at node i  in time period t , ( ) iit ijt j Fω ω ∈=   
t0 time period of departure from node s, with t0 = −1 indicating not yet 
departed, t0 = −1, 0, 1, …., t0,max   
 
Data 
 s    start node in physical graph  
 d    destination node in physical graph 
ijtijt








( )it itq ω   probability of scenario vector itω  at node i  in time period t ; 
 




p ω   probability that the attacker survives arc (i, j) ∈A  if the attacker starts 
traversing this arc in time period t  in scenario ijt ijtω ∈Ω  
ijtijt
r ω   risk to the attacker on arc (i, j) ∈A  if starting traversing the arc in time 
period  t  in scenario ijt ijtω ∈Ω ; rijtω ijt = − log pijtω ijt  
ijtijtωτ   travel time from i ∈N  to j ∈N  if the attacker starts traversing arc 
 (i, j) ∈A  in time period t  in scenario ijt ijtω ∈Ω  
maxt   maximum allowable travel time from s to d  
0,maxt   maximum allowable waiting time at s  
 
Function 
 V (i,t,t0 )   Minimum expected risk to travel from node i  to node d  starting in time 
period  t  and given that the attacker departed node s at time period t0. This 
function is defined as follows:  
 
(Bellman Equations for the attacker’s decisions)
 
    
( ) ( ) ( ){ }0 0,max { }
I.  If 1, ,  and  (attacker has not started) :




st st sst sjt sjtj F s
t i s t t
V s t q r V s t r V j t tω ω ω
ω
ω τ∈ −∈Ω
= − = ≤
⎡ ⎤− = + + − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  
    
( ) ( )
0 0 max
0 0
II.  If 0, ,  and  (attacker has not reached destination) :




it it ijt sjtj F
t i d t t t




≥ ≠ − ≤




    ( )
0 0,maxIII.  If 1, ,  and  (attacker has exceeded start time) :
, , 1 .
t i s t t
V s t
= − = >
− = ∞  
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    ( )
0 0 max
0
IV.  If 0 and  (attacker has exceeded finish time) :
, , .
t t t t
V i t t
≥ − >
= ∞  
    ( )
0 0 max
0
V.  If 0, ,  and  (attacker has reached destination) :
, , 0.
t i d t t t
V d t t




AM:    Determine V(s, 0, 1− )
    
 (1) 
 
AM includes five versions of Bellman’s equation.  Version  I deals with the 
situation when the attacker has not departed the start node s.  Version II  represents the 
situation where the attacker has not reached its destination.  Versions III and IV assign an 
infinite value when the attacker has not departed its start node within the allowable time 
window or when it does not reach the destination within time.  Version V assigns zero to 
a state corresponding to the attacker’s arrival at the destination within the time window.  
2. The Defender-Attacker Model 
The defender influences the attacker’s risk by changing the probabilities 
ijtijt
q ω  
and risks 
ijtijt
r ω associated with scenarios on arcs.  Specifically, the defender assigns each 
search platform a mission.  The mission specifies a sequence of arcs, one for each time 
period, which the search platform will examine.  Typically, if a search platform examines 
an arc, then the risk is high for the attacker on that arc.  Therefore, the presence or 
absence of the defender determines risk.  Scenarios on the arcs, such as environmental 
conditions, also determine risk.  This section formulates an optimization model that 
maximizes the minimum expected risk to the attacker by assigning a mission to each 
platform.  We refer to this model as the Defender-Attacker Model (DAM). 
 
Indices and Index Sets 
l L∈    defender platform 
lm M∈   mission that platform l may execute 
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Decision Variables 
lmx   1 if platform l executes mission lm M∈ ; 0 otherwise 





q xω   probability of scenario ijt ijtω ∈Ω  on arc (i, j) ∈A  in time period t given 









r xω   risk of scenario ijt ijtω ∈Ω  on arc (i, j) ∈A  in time period t given mission 
plan x  
( )f x   minimum expected risk, given mission plan x , to travel from node s to 
node d departing s no later than time period t0,max and arriving at d no later 
than tmax time periods after departing s; ( ) ( , 0, 1)xf x V s= − , where 
( ,0, 1)xV s −  is defined identical to ( ,0, 1)V s − , see Equation (1), except with 
ijtijt
q ω  replaced by 
( )
ijtijt
q xω  and ijtijtr ω  replaced by 
( )
ijtijt
r xω . 
Formulation  
DAM:    ( )max
x
f x
    
 (2) 
 






≤ ∀∑  (3) 
 {0,1} ,lmx l m∈ ∀  (4) 
 
The DAM objective function (2) maximizes the attacker’s minimum expected risk 
of travel from node s to node d , given that the attacker departs s no later than time 
period t0,max and arrives at d no later than tmax time periods after departing s.  Constraints 
(3) and (4) require that each defensive platform carry out at most one mission. 
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3. Algorithm 
A standard max-min formulation can be solved using Benders Decomposition, 
which builds a concave piecewise linear function of the function being maximized 
(Benders, 1962).  But, to use Benders Decomposition, the function must be concave, 
which may not be the case for DAM.  Therefore, we use Global Benders Decomposition 
(GLBD) (Salmerón et al., 2009).  The AM is the GLBD subproblem and could be solved 
by dynamic programming.  However, we plan to utilize the more efficient all-to-one 
label-correcting Temporal Dependence One-Step Spatial Dependence (TD-OSP) 
Algorithm developed by Waller and Ziliaskopoulos (2002).  This algorithm finds a 
solution with the least expected risk in pseudo-polynomial time on acyclic graphs.  The 
GLBD master problem is a linearization of DAM given in the K-th iteration by   
 
MP-GLBD:    max z
    
 (5) 
  




l L m M
f x x x z k Kα
∈ ∈
+ − ≥ ∀ =∑ ∑ K  (6) 






≤ ∀∑  (7)  
 {0,1} ,lmx l m∈ ∀  (8) 
 
where ˆklmx  is the solution examined in the k-th AM subproblem and ˆ( )
kf x  is the 
corresponding optimal value of the AM subproblem.  Constraint (6) is a set of linear 
approximations of the objective function in DAM.  Specifically, klmα , l L∈ , lm M∈ , are 




l L m M
f x x x f xα
∈ ∈
+ − ≥∑ ∑  for all ( ) , llm l L m Mx x ∈ ∈=  such 
that (7) and (8) hold.  In the next chapter, we consider a specific situation where such an 
upper bound can easily be computed.  GLBD consists of alternating between solving the 
AM subproblem and MP-GLBD master problem.  The subproblem provides a lower 
bound on the optimal value of DAM and MP-GLBD an upper bound. 
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III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter is organized in the following way: Section B presents an overview 
and the development of six operational cases JIATF-S operators could face any day.    In 
Section C, we analyze the six cases, and discuss the results and insights of this analysis.  
Section D uses two of the six cases to determine the number of missions in which the 
defender can increase the attacker’s risk more than ten percent.   
We implement DAM using Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) to solve AM and 
General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) with the CPLEX solver to solve MP-
GLBD.  The implementation was run on a Dell Precision desktop computer T7400 with 
an Intel Xenon 3.16GHz CPU with 3.25GB RAM, with the Windows XP Professional 
operating system.  
B. OPERATIONAL CASES 
The numerical case study presented in this chapter includes a baseline situation, 
and several case variations of this baseline situation for sensitivity analysis and 
evaluation of the robustness of the baseline situation’s results and insights.  
1. Baseline Situation 
The baseline situation takes place in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, bounded between 
latitude lines 17° North latitude and 7° South latitude and 77° and 104° West longitude, 
encompassing 1680 nm “wide” by 1500 nm “high.”  We discretize this area into 700 
60nm by 60nm square cells, though only a small portion of cells are used in any given 
situation; see Figure 8.  Each cell represents a node in the physical graph in DAM.  The 
origin of this map occurs at the lower left-hand corner, with the numbers on the bottom 
referring to x-coordinates and the numbers on the left referring to y-coordinates of 
attacker seacraft and defender platforms.  We display the coast of Colombia on the lower 
right and the coast of Mexico on the upper left.  Cell “A” in Figure 8 is the attacker, cell 
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“C” is the Comalapa, Ecuador Forward Operating Location (FOL) and the only cell 
where the defender’s P-3 and C-130 platforms originate, and cell “F” is the defender’s 
FFG.  The FFG’s position is dynamic and can occur in any of the white cells.  All black 
cells, and cell “C”, represent land in Figure 8.  The grid allows for many possible 
“Contact Reports,” but in any one case, only a portion of the map is actually used and 


























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28  
Figure 8.   Snapshot of Eastern Pacific Ocean in Microsoft Excel.  Each cell is a 60 
nautical mile square.  We display the coast of Colombia on the lower right and the coast 
of Mexico on the upper left.  Cell “A” is the attacker, cell “C” is the Comalapa, Ecuador 
FOL (the only cell where the defender’s P-3 and C-130 platforms originate), and cell “F” 
is the defender’s FFG.  All black cells, and cell “C”, represent land. 
The attacker’s start node in the physical graph, s, is coordinate pair (17, 16) and 
determined by translating his latitude-longitude position into a cell in Figure 8.  There is 
no delay, t0,max = 0, in reporting the attacker at s and the JIATF-S operator receiving this 
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information.  We assume that JIATF-S has intelligence that the attacker aims for land 
coordinate (7, 21) and set d to be the node in the physical graph that corresponds to that 
coordinate.  In general, uncertainty about the attacker’s destination can be reflected by 
adding additional arcs in the physical graph and letting d be a “super sink.”  
We assume the attacker desires forward movement at all times.  Therefore, we 
model the attacker with the possible movement to three immediate neighboring cells (left, 
right, and forward) in a single time period or waiting in the current cell for one time 
period.  Each such move or waiting is represented by an arc in the physical graph.  We do 
not model backward or diagonal movement.  This results in the physical graph having a 
maximum forward star of size four.  The forward star is not always size four due to land 
constraints.  There are two possible scenarios that can occur on each arc and time period, 
i.e., { }1,2   ijt ijtΩ ∈ ∀ .  Let lmS  be the set of triplets ( , , )i j t  such that platform l on 
mission m searches arc ( , )i j  during time period t.  When no defensive platform is 
present on ( , )i j  during time period t, the probability of scenario 1 occurring equals 0.7, 
i.e., 1( )ijtq x =0.7 when lmx =0 for all l and m such that ( , , ) lmi j t S∈ .  The probability of 
scenario 2 occurring equals 0.3, i.e., 2( )ijtq x =0.3 when lmx =0 for all l and m such that 
( , , ) lmi j t S∈ .  When at least one defender platform is present on arc ( , )i j  during time 
period t, then the probabilities of scenarios 1 and 2 occurring equal 0.9 and 0.1, 
respectively, i.e., 1( )ijtq x =0.9 and 2( )ijtq x =0.1 when lmx =1 for at least one pair ( , )l m  
such that ( , , ) lmi j t S∈ .  We compute the risks, 1( )ijtr x  and 2( )ijtr x  using the information 
provided in Appendices A and B.  Each type of attacker seacraft can traverse a square 
cell in one time period.  Hence, 
ijtijtωτ =1 for all attacker seacraft, and a time period 
represents different amounts of time depending on the attacker’s speed.  We assume a 
constant speed of 6 knots for an SPSS, 15 knots for a Panga, and 25 knots for a Go-Fast.  
The defender’s initial FFG position is coordinate pair (15, 17) and both the P-3 
and C-130 are located at coordinate pair (15, 17), the Comalapa FOL.   These coordinates 
are determined by translating their latitude-longitude positions into a cell in Figure 8.  We 
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determine the set of possible missions, lM , that platform l may execute via time-distance 
calculations.  These calculations begin by determining if the defender’s platform can 
reach the tail of an arc before the attacker can reach that tail.  If so, that arc will become a 
one-time period mission.  Additionally, for every arc emanating from the forward star of 
a one-time period mission, the defender will add this arc to the original arc to become a 
two-time period mission.  Missions continue to be made by adding arcs in the forward 
star for maxt  time periods.  We assume a constant speed of 15 knots for an FFG and 180 
knots for both the P-3 and C-130.   
We compute the cut coefficients klmα  in (6) by setting klmα =0 if ˆklmx =1 and 
otherwise set 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
( , , )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (0) (0) (0) (0)
lm
k
lm ijt lm ijt lm ijt lm ijt lm ijt ijt ijt ijt
i j t S
q e r e q e r e q r q rα
∈
⎡ ⎤= + − −⎣ ⎦∑ , where 
lme  is the unit vector with components all zero except the (l,m)-component, which is 
unity. Effectively, klmα  equals the expected risk to an attacker that traverses arcs covered 
by platform l on mission m, minus the expected risk absent any defender.  Under the 
assumption that a platform does not influence the probabilities of scenarios and risks on 
other arcs and time periods than those covered by the platform, it appears that this leads 
to a valid cut in (6).  However, this thesis does not provide a formal proof. 
2. Case Studies 
The six case studies are defined as follows.  In Case 1, the defender consists of 
one frigate (FFG) and we set time horizon maxt = 5 and 0,maxt = 0, hence the attacker must 
depart immediately.  In Case 2, the defender consists of one air platform (P-3) and we set 
maxt = 5 and 0,maxt = 0.  In Case 3, the defender consists of one frigate (FFG) and both air 
platforms (P-3 & C-130) and we set maxt = 5 and 0,maxt = 0.  In Case 4, the defender 
consists of one frigate (FFG) and we set maxt  = 7 and 0,maxt = 0.  In Case 5, the defender 
consists of one air platform (P-3) and we set maxt = 7 and 0,maxt = 0.  In Case 6, the 
defender consists of one frigate (FFG) and both air platforms (P-3 & C-130) and we set 
maxt = 7 and 0,maxt = 0.   Table 1 summarizes the six cases and also gives the total number 
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of missions for all platforms, i.e., l
l
M∏ , where lM  is the cardinality of lM , and the 
minimum expected risk to the attacker in the absence of any defender for three attacker 
seacraft.  We refer to this risk as the “inherent risk.” 
 
   Defender 
Platform(s) max











Case 1 FFG 5 266 2.551 3.470 4.232 
Case 2 Air Platforms 5 284 2.551 3.470 4.232 
Case 3 FFG & Air Platforms  5 21,454,496 2.551 3.470 4.232 
Case 4 FFG 7 3,998 3.042 4.374 5.361 
Case 5 Air Platforms 7 12,730 3.042 4.374 5.361 
Case 6 FFG & Air Platforms  7 647 billion 3.042 4.374 5.361 
Table 1.   SPSS data for Cases 1-6.  Column one shows the defender platforms 
available.  Column two shows the number of time periods available to 
prosecute the attacker.  Column three shows the total number of missions.  
Columns four, five, and six show the inherent risk for the SPSS, Panga, and 
Go-Fast, respectively. 
C. RESULTS AND INSIGHTS 
We solve DAM for the six cases described above, for each attacker seacraft, using 
GLBD with results summarized in Tables 2, 3, and 4.  Column one shows the DAM 
solution time.  Column two shows the total enumeration solution time (N/C = Not 
Computed), i.e., the time required to solve AM for all missions.  Column three shows 
maximum risk obtained by GLBD within two hours of computation time.  Column four 
shows the percentage increase in this risk over the inherent risk.  Column five shows the 
optimal risk in DAM, computed by total enumeration when available.  Column six shows 
the relative gap between maximum risk from GLBD after two hours and the optimal risk.  


























Case 1 502 51 2.595 1.7% 2.595 0% 0% 
Case 2 522 280 2.964 16.2% 2.964 0% 0% 
Case 3 > 7200 N/C 3.099 5.3% N/C N/C 1694% 
Case 4 > 7200 4250 3.113 2.3% 3.182 2.2% 563% 
Case 5 > 7200 13023 3.548 16.6% 3.760 5.6% 829% 
Case 6 > 7200 N/C 3.542 16.4% N/C N/C 1399% 
Table 2.   Results of Cases 1-6 with SPSS.  Column one shows the GLBD solution 
time.  Column two shows the total enumeration solution time.  Column 
three shows the GLBD Lower Bound.  Column four shows the percentage 
that the GLBD risk raises the inherent risk.  Column five shows the optimal 
risk computed by total enumeration.  Column six shows the relative gap 
between the GLBD risk and the optimal risk.  Column seven shows the 
























Case 1 503 53 3.862 11.3% 3.862 0% 0% 
Case 2 522 303 3.970 14.4% 3.970 0% 0% 
Case 3 > 7200 N/C 4.011 7.3% N/C N/C 999% 
Case 4 > 7200 4160 4.411 0.9% 4.450 0.9% 422% 
Case 5 > 7200 13016 4.782 11.6% 5.085 6.0% 617% 
Case 6 > 7200 N/C 4.491 2.7% N/C N/C 1275% 
Table 3.   Results of Cases 1-6 with Panga.  All columns in Table 3 correspond to 


























Case 1 502 41 4.266 0.8% 4.266 0% 0% 
Case 2 522 306 4.575 8.1% 4.575 0% 0% 
Case 3 > 7200 N/C 5.46 6.3% N/C N/C 355% 
Case 4 > 7200 4070 5.401 0.7% 5.445 0.8% 286% 
Case 5 > 7200 13092 5.824 8.6% 6.101 4.5% 427% 
Case 6 > 7200 N/C 5.783 7.9% N/C N/C 573% 
Table 4.   Results of Cases 1-6 with Go-Fast.  All columns in Table 4 correspond to 
those in Table 2. 
 As we can see from Cases 1 and 2 in Tables 4, 5, and 6, GLBD obtains the 
optimal solution in less than 10 minutes for small instances of DAM involving less than 
300 missions.  We also see that GLBD is slower than total enumeration of all possible 
solutions in DAM when such enumeration is feasible.  We believe this occurs because the 
number of missions is small and the VBA-GAMS interface is rather inefficient.  As for 
Cases 3, 4, 5, and 6, GLBD cannot obtain the optimal solution within two hours of run 
time for medium and large instances of DAM, involving several thousand missions.  
After two hours of calculations, we still observe a large gap between the upper and lower 
bounds in GLBD as displayed in Column seven in Tables 2, 3, and 4.  However, as 
indicated by Cases 4 and 5, the solution obtained by GLBD in two hours tends to be close 
to the optimal risk (within 6%), regardless of attacker; see Column six in Tables 2, 3, and 
4.  Hence, even if the GLBD gaps are large due to weak upper cuts, GLBD can be used as 
a heuristic. 
We collect the mission plans associated with the maximum risk output of GLBD, 
regardless if DAM produced the optimal solution or was stopped after two hours of 
calculations.  Figure 9 shows a representative plot of mission plans for Cases 1, 2, 4, and 
5.  In Cases 1 and 2, i.e., cases where DAM produced the optimal solution, the mission 
plans have the defender platform patrol arcs associated with the two cells immediately to 
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the left of the attacker; the first cells for the attacker to move through, regardless of 
defender platform or attacker seacraft.  Figure 9 illustrates Case 1’s FFG mission plan 
against a Panga as a representative plan for Cases 1, 2, 4, and 5, since the optimal plans 
are similar, regardless of defender platform or attacker seacraft.  The numbers 1, 2, and 3 
correspond to the order of cell movement by the FFG.  Therefore, in this example, the 
FFG first patrols the arc from cell (16,16) to cell (16,17) during the first time period of 
the FFG’s mission, patrols the arc from cell (16,17) to cell (16,16) during the second time 
period of the FFG’s mission, and patrols the arc from cell (16,16) to cell (16,17) during 
the third time period of the FFG’s mission.  In Cases 4 and 5, cases where DAM stopped 




Figure 9.   Snapshot of DAM mission plans, regardless of attacker.  Cell “A” is the 
attacker, cell “C” is the Comalapa, Ecuador FOL (the only cell where the defender’s P-3 
and C-130 platforms originate), cell “d” is the attacker’s default destination, and cell “F” 
is the defender’s FFG.  The numbers “1”, “2”, and “3” correspond to a representative 
sequence of cells in the defender’s mission plan. 
Figure 10 illustrates Case 3’s mission plan, involving all three defender platforms, 
against a Panga as a as a representative plan for Cases 3 and 6, since the optimal plans are 
similar, regardless of defender platform or attacker seacraft.  Cases 3 and 6 have mission 
plans with the defender platform patrolling the six cells immediately to the left of the 
attacker; the first six cell options for the attacker to move through.  The numbers 1, 2, and 
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3 correspond to the order of cell movement described above.  Interestingly, the defenders 
were layered so as to have the C-130 patrol the first two cells immediately to the left of 
the attacker, the P-3 patrol the two cells immediately to the left of the C-130, and the 
FFG patrol the subsequent two cells to the left of the P-3.  This makes sense because the 
C-130 has the best probability of detection, the P-3 has the second best, and the FFG has 
the least. 
 
Figure 10.   Snapshot of DAM mission plans, regardless of attacker.  Cell “A” is the 
attacker, cell “C” is the Comalapa, Ecuador FOL (the only cell where the defender’s P-3 
and C-130 platforms originate), cell “d” is the attacker’s default destination,  and cell “F” 
is the defender’s FFG.  The numbers “1”, “2”, and “3” correspond to a representative 
sequence of cells in the defender’s mission plan. 
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D. THE NEED FOR A TACTICAL DECISION TOOL 
 To gain a deeper insight into the difficulty in obtaining an optimal solution of 
DAM, we analyze data produced by total enumeration of Cases 4 and 5.  To do this, we 
count the number of missions increasing the inherent risk by less than 10%, and divide 
this number by the total number of missions a defender platform can perform.  Figure 11 
illustrates these results.  We note that the set of missions, lM , includes missions of 
different duration.  Hence, while the maximum allowable travel time, maxt , for the 
attacker is 7 in Cases 4 and 5, the defender considers missions of shorter duration as the 
conservation of flight hours may be important for a decision maker.  We see for Case 4 
that regardless of platform, approximately 90% of one-time period missions result in less 
than a ten percent increase in inherent risk.  The percentage of missions with substantial 
increase above the inherent risk increases as the number of time periods in a mission 
increases.  This result is reasonable as the longer a defender performs a mission, the more 
arcs he can search and the more he can increase the risk.  We see similar, but higher, 
percentages in Case 5.  We believe these percentages are high because Case 4 has 3,998 
possible missions and Case 5 has 12,730 possible missions.  This result is in general 
agreement with JIATF-S, who estimates they do not detect the attacker in seven out of 
eight missions, an 87.5% failure rate (private communication with Sellers, 2010).  Figure 
11 indeed indicates that there typically exist a large number of missions which do not 
significantly increase the risk to the attacker above the inherent risk.  This, of course, 
indicates the need for a model like DAM and an associated algorithm.  It also makes it 
challenging to develop a Benders-type decomposition algorithm as cuts of this form, 
Equation (6), are typically weak.   
 Note that the difference between the Case 4 and Case 5 percentages in Figure 11, 
with many more missions in Case 5 resulting in an increase of inherent risk less than ten 
percent.  At first glance, this seems counter intuitive since the air platforms have better 
radars than the frigate.  Upon further investigation, we believe radars cannot be the 
source since both air platforms have different radars, yet the same percentages.  We  
 
  26
believe the starting location of the defender relative to the attacker’s location is the likely 
reason because both air platforms have the same starting location (the FOL) and the same 
speed.   
 
 




IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis develops a model that prescribes the optimal defensive plan to 
maximize a smuggler’s risk.  We assume the smuggler  intelligent and with imperfect 
knowledge of law enforcement platform locations but is aware that there is law 
enforcement that must be avoided.  We demonstrate that through actionable intelligence, 
the Optimal Detection Problem can use a defender-attacker optimization model to 
maximize the smuggler’s minimum risk through the optimal placement of three different 
types of law enforcement platforms against an intelligent smuggler, in one of three 
different types of seacraft.  We demonstrate our defender-attacker model in the Eastern 
Pacific Ocean using three representative law enforcement platform types whose detection 
performance varies by platform and geography and three representative smuggler 
seacrafts whose risk varies by size and speed.  In all of these cases, we find that further 
algorithmic development is needed to allow real-time use of this model and algorithm 
become a tactical level mission-planning aid to counter seacraft currently being used by 
drug smugglers.   
We demonstrate in all cases, the DAM’s solution is always greater than the 
inherent risk, and since 60%–98% of air missions and 40%–90% of frigate missions do 
little more than increase inherent risk by less than ten percent, we believe this would be a 
good initial recommendation for law enforcement allocation.  We also demonstrate that 
the DAM is not fast enough to allow real-time use of this model and algorithm. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are several interesting research avenues to be extended from this thesis.  
First, we recommend further algorithmic development needed to allow real-time use of 
this model and algorithm.  Second, we show the largest increase in risk to the attacker 
comes from the early defender time periods (usually the second time period).  Due to 
limitations on flight hours, and the high cost of flying hours, it would appear an optimal 
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employment policy for defender air platforms would be to limit air platform searches to 
only two time periods and return to the FOL, regardless of fuel or flight hours still 
remaining.  We recommend further research into the feasibility and optimality of this 
type of policy in that may lead to better utilization of the defender platforms.  Third, 
improved efficiency of our model can enable more time discretization and the analysis of 
larger scenarios.  This would allow us to model the attacker’s diagonal movements as 
well.  Fourth, we recommend further analysis into researching a model to determine the 
number of time periods where the maximum risk will occur.  Finally, we recommend 














APPENDIX A.  SENSOR PLATFORM PERFORMANCE 
ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA 
This appendix presents the assumptions and data values used to determine the 
attacker’s probability of survival ( )
ijtijt
p xω .  This probability varies for each defender 
platform and each attacker platform.  In general, we use the assumptions and rationale 
used by Pfeiff (2009).  But, we use different assumptions and rationale for the Frigate 
search platform and shipping density. 
A. MOVING SEARCH PLATFORM TYPES 
The defender’s platforms search arcs according to the missions they are assigned, 
as depicted in Figure 9.  DAM only recommends the arcs (cells) to search, not the method 
of searching; that is decided by the defender operators.  We assume that the probability of 









where lijw  is the sensor sweep width of defender platform l on arc ( , )i j , and lv  is the 
speed of defender platform l, both are presented in greater detail below.  The time the 
attacker traverses an arc, λ , depends on the attacker’s speed.  We assume the SPSS 
speed is a constant 6 knots, the Panga speed is a constant 10 knots, and the Go-Fast speed 
is a constant 25 knots.  Therefore, since all arcs measure 60nm, λ  equals 10 hours for an 
SPSS, 6 hours for a Panga, and 2.4 hours for a Go-Fast.  The defender searches half of 
cell i and half of cell j during time period t, therefore the area being searched, A, equates 
to 3600 nm2.  We assume defender platforms only detect attackers inside their assigned 
search cells. 
1. P-3 Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
We assume the P-3 Orion to search at v = 180 nm/hr.  We assume radar is the 
primary search sensor for the Orion and use this solely to determine the probability of 
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detection.  The APS-137 radar is the primary search radar used by JIATF-S (private 
communication with Sellers, 2010).  Table 1 is used to determine APS-137 sweep width, 
w (USCG, 2004). 
 
Table 5.   APS-137 Sweep Widths (From USCG, 2004). 
We assume Orions operating in 32nm radar range scale.  We also assume the SPSS to 
have the same radar cross section as a 17-25 foot recreational boat, the Panga to have the 
same radar cross section as a 26-35 foot recreational boat, and a Go-Fast to have the same 
radar cross section as a 36-50 foot recreational boat.  On-scene surface winds will vary 
from cell to cell, and time of year, based upon the surface wind data presented in 
Appendix B. 
2.  C-130 Hercules Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
 We assume the C-130 Hercules aircraft to search at v = 180 nm/hr.  We assume 
radar is the primary search sensor for the Hercules and use this solely to determine the 
probability of detection.  The APS-145 radar is the primary search radar used by JIATF-S 
(private communication with Sellers, 2010).  We do not find a table of the APS-145 
sweep width, so we derive the APS-145 sweep width, w, from the APS-137 sweep width.  
Radar range depends on a number of factors including target radar cross section.  The 
APS-137 transmits power at approximately 500 kW (Pfeiff, 2009) and APS-145 transmits 
power at approximately 1 mW (Pfeiff, 2009).  The APS-145 antenna area is roughly 20 
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times APS-137 antenna area (Pfeiff, 2009).  Since the radar range varies by the fourth 
root of antenna area multiplied by transmission power, we apply a scalar of 2.5 to the 
APS-137 sweep width to obtain the estimated APS-145 sweep width (radartutorial.eu).  
3.  Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate (FFG) Surface Platform Type 
 We assume FFGs search at v = 10 nm/hr.  We assume surface search radar is the 
primary search sensor for the FFG and use this only to determine the probability of 
detection.  The AN/SPSS-55 is the primary surface search radar used by U.S. Navy 
FFGs.  We did not find a table of the AN/SPSS-55 sweep width, so we derive the 
AN/SPSS-55 sweep width, w, from the APS-137 sweep width.  Radar range depends on a 
number of factors including target radar cross section.  The APS-137 transmits power at 
approximately 500 kW (Pfeiff, 2009) and AN/SPSS-55 transmits power at approximately 
kW (wikipedia, 2010).  The AN/SPSS-55 antenna area is roughly the same size as the 
APS-137 antenna area (Wikipedia, 2010).  Since the radar range varies by the fourth root 
of antenna area multiplied by transmission power, we apply a scalar of 0.7 to the APS-
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APPENDIX B.  GEOGRAPHIC MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA  
This appendix presents the assumptions and data used to determine how the 
probability of detection varies by geographic location. 
A. SURFACE WINDS  
As discussed in Appendix A, surface winds influence radar sweep widths.  We 
use a monthly average of surface winds taken from Special Sensor Microwave/Imager 
satellite data as a representative wind distribution for the Eastern Pacific Ocean (Remote 
Sensing Systems, 2010). 
 
Figure 12.   Monthly Average Surface Wind Speed July 2010 (From: 
http://www.remss.com/ssmi/ssmi_browse.html, 2010). 
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Figure 13.   Monthly Average Surface Wind Speed July 2010 (From: 
http://www.remss.com/ssmi/ssmi_browse.html, 2010). 
We use the monthly average winds from Figure 12 to construct the wind models shown 
in Figures 13. 
B. COMMERCIAL SHIPPING TRAFFIC 
It is unclear whether attackers prefer shipping lanes to blend in with neutral 
contacts or avoid shipping lanes due to potential contact reports (private communication 
with Sellers, 2010).  Hence, we do not model commercial shipping traffic.   
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